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In Felder v. reat American Insmrance Company1 the com-
plaint alleged that Mr. and Mrs. Felder had given a note and a
mortgage on their home to Home Federal Savings and Loan and
shortly thereafter had procured a health and accident policy
from the defendant through Home Federal as agent. After
becoming entitled to payments under the policy, the Felders had
received policy benefits for three months and then had been told
by Home Federal that further claims would be useless. As a
result the Felders allegedly had to sell their home at a loss to
prevent foreclosure. The complaint contained three separate
causes of action, fraud and deceit, breach of contract accom-
panied by a fraudulent act and negligence.
The district court found that the complaint stated a cause of
action in fraud. The requisite elements in South Carolina for an
action in fraud are: (1) A representation; (2) its falsity; (3) its
materiality; (4) the speaker's knowledge of its falsity; (5) his
intent that it should be acted upon by the person; (6) the hear-
er's ignorance of its falsity; (7) his reliance on its truth; (8) his
right to rely thereon; (9) and his consequent and proximate in-
jury.2 Normally the failure of an insurance company to pay
money due under a policy does not support a fraud action,8 be-
cause of a lack of a representation or the speaker's knowledge of
its falsity. But here, the insurance company had made a lump
sum payment after the statements were made by Home Federal.
As proper allegations of the knowledge of the falsity of these
statements had been made, an action for fraud was validly
maintainable.
The court found that an action for breach of contract accom-
panied by a fraudulent act was also properly alleged. It resolved
the apparent conflict with the fraud action by pointing out that
the breach was in not paying on time rather than not paying
at all.
1. 260 F. Supp. 575 (D.S.C. 1966).
2. Id. at 577, accord, e.g., Jones v. Cooper, 234 S.C. 477, 109 S.E2d 5
(1959).
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The cause of action for negligence was dismissed. The court
required "a duty arising out of the relation created by the con-
tract which exists apart from the contract." 4 The court stated
that no authority supporting a co-existing duty had been called
to its attention. It would appear that cases involving negligent
misrepresentation would be germane on this point.5 The separate
duty here would be to use due care with respect to statements
made concerning rights under the contract. A more difficult
question would be whether the South Carolina Supreme Court
would impose liability for negligent misrepresentations leading
to economic harm.6
In the case of Locklair v. Locklair7 the plaintiff, a resident
of South Carolina, was injured in an automobile accident which
occurred in Georgia while she was riding as a guest passenger
in her husband's automobile. The plaintiff sought to bring action
against her husband in the district court. Under the South Caro-
lina conflicts rule the interspousal immunity law of Geogia was
applied and recovery was denied. The court stated that-none of
the plaintiff's constitutional rights had been violated by the
application of Georgia law which clearly provided that she had
no cause of action against her husband under the facts in this
case.8
The case of Kapuschinsky v. United States9 involved an ac-
tion under the Federal Tort Claims Act.10 Liability was estab-
lished but a question arose concerning the amount of damages.
The court reiterated the elements determining the amount of
damages a personal injury plaintiff could recover. These in-
cluded pain and suffering, medical expenses and any future
damages resulting from permanent injuries. The future damages
were measured as those which "it [was] reasonably certain will
4. Felder v. Great American Ins. Co., 260 F. Supp. 575 (D.S.C. 1966).
5. The cases are collected in W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 721-24 (3d ed.
1964). Manock v. Amos T. Bridge's Sons, Inc., 86 N.H. 411, 169 A. 881
(1934) seems especially appropriate.
6. The South Carolina cases cited by the court in the portion of the opinion
devoted to the negligence action are not dispositive of the question. Only Law-
son v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 169 S.C. 540, 169 S.E. 430 (1933) involves
a negligent misrepresentation and the only loss was benefits under the contract.
In the instant case the loss was not of contract benefits.
7. 256 F. Supp. 530 (D.S.C. 1966).
8. GA. CODE ANN. § 53-501 (1933); e.g., Wallach v. Wallach, 94 Ga. App.
576, 95 S.E.2d 750 (1956) ; Wright v. Wright, 85 Ga. App. 721, 70 S.E2d 152
(1952).
9. 259 F. Supp. 1 (D.S.C. 1966).
10. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80 (1964). -
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of necessity result from the injuries."'1 This included the accom-
panying pain and suffering which would, with reasonable
certainty, result.
Thus the Court stated that the four-year-old child who suf-
fered deformed extremities which would give rise to traumatic
arthritis and future disproportionate body measurements was
entitled to damages of $175,000.
In McVey v. Whittington'2 the plaintiff was struck by the
defendant's automobile while she was attempting to push a
stalled vehicle off the highway. The evidence on the question of
the defendant's negligence was to the effect that the vehicle the
plaintiff was pushing had five rear lights and it was a clear
night. The plaintiff was wearing white slacks and the vehicle
had a white top. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed
the decision of the common pleas court holding that this raised a
jury question and entered judgment for plaintiff on the jury
verdict.
In Sox v. Hertz Corporation'3 the defendant sought to make
itself a third party plaintiff and have the mother of the de-
ceased, who was driving the automobile in which the deceased
was killed, made a third party defendant. The motion to inter-
plead was denied on the grounds that injustice might arise if the
jury were forced to consider that the mother was liable and that
the third-party complaint against the mother would lead to con-
fusion and possible prejudice. The court stated that under South
Carolina law, plaintiff may elect to sue either of joint tort-
feasors singly and one defendant cannot defeat that right by
seeking to bring in another defendant.1
4
In Hughey v. Ausborm' 5 the court held that punitive damages
were not available on a suit for loss of consortium.-"
B. Joint Tort-Feasors
In Ayers v. Pastime Amusement Company,17 an action was
brought against exhibitors and distributors of motion pictures
11. Kapuschinsky v. United States, 259 F. Supp. 1, 6 (1966).
12. 248 S.C. 447, 151 S.E2d 92 (1966).
13. 262 F. Supp. 531 (1967).
14. Pendleton v. Columbia Ry. Gas & Elec. Co., 133 S.C. 326, 131 S.E. 265
(1925) ; National Bank v. Southern Ry., 107 S.C. 28, 91 S.E. 972 (1917).
15. 154 S.E2d 839 (S.C. 1967).
16. The case is more fully discussed under Damages, supra, p. 563.
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,for alleged violation of a federal anti-trust statute. An agree-
ment, termed a covenant not to sue, was executed between the
plaintiffs and all but two of the defendants. The remaining two
defendants sought summary judgment on the grounds that the
instrument was a release. The district court held that federal
law controlled the effect of the instrument, and that, while no
decision of the supreme court or Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit was precisely in point, the instrument was clearly not
operative as a release. The court noted, in passing, that had
South Carolina law controlled the result would have been the
same.18
In the case of Travelers Insurance Company v. Allstate In-
surance Company,1 9 the plaintiff company brought an action
alleging unjust enrichment and seeking contribution when it
had to pay the entire judgment against five joint tort-feasors,
only two of which were insured by the plaintiff. In holding the
action demurrable the court reasoned that, since South Carolina
still recognizes the common law principle precluding contribu-
tion among joint tort-feasors,20 the defendant's insured was dis-
charged. Since the defendant insurance company had only
contracted to pay actual obligations of its insured, to require
it to pay now would amount to the court's rewriting of the
contract.
C. Duty of Care
In Kimbrell v. Bi-Lo, Inc.21 the plaintiff sustained a fall in
the defendant's self-service grocery. The access to the defendant's
store was through double doors and the sidewalk was set six
inches above the floor of the store. This difference in elevation
made necessary a ramp leading from the sidewalk to the floor
of the store. The ramp was constructed of plywood and extended
four feet into the store. There were no handrails or warning
signs present. The plaintiff, an elderly woman, entered the store
and decided to select a shopping cart from a group to the imme-
diate right of the ramp. She turned to go to the carts and walked
18. This is presumed to be the law in South Carolina though the issue has
never come before the South Carolina Supreme Court. See McWhirter v. Otis
Elevator Co., 40 F. Supp. 11 (D.S.C. 1941).
19. 155 S.E.2d 591 (S.C. 1967).
20. The text writers have condemned the rule and a majority of jurisdictions
now permit some form of contribution. See W. PRossER, LAw oF TORTS § 47
(3d ed. 1964).
21. 248 S.C. 365, 150 S.E.2d 79 (1966).
4
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off the side of the ramp and fell. The plaintiff recovered $3,500
actual damages and the defendant appealed a denial of a motion
for directed verdict and for judgment n.o.v. The court stated
that:
It is reasonably inferable that the miscalculation on the
part of the plaintiff was induced by the similarity of ap-
pearance of the two surfaces, the absence of any warning or
handrail, and the invitation on the part of the defendant to
proceed off the side of the ramp to the carts.22
Thus, the court held that the question of negligence was for
determination by the jury. For one dissenting justice, the ob-
viousness of the hazards led to the conclusion that the plaintiff
was guilty of contributory negligence.
An automobile passenger brought action against a contractor
in Citizens and &ouherm NationaZ Bank v. Dickerson, Inc.23
The passenger was struck by a board which allegedly protruded
from the guard rail running along the center of a bridge which
was being widened by the defendant. The issue presented was
whether the evidence was sufficient to justify submission to the
jury. The court found evidence that the guard rail narrowed
the lane of south bound traffic, that the contractor removed the
flambeau and flashing lights from the guard rail, and that the
contractor failed to make daily inspection of the condition of
the bridge, justified the submission of the issue of negligence
to the jury. The court found that an award of $260,000 actual
and $5,000 punitive damages was not excessive in the light of the
permanent brain damage and facial disfigurement of the
plaintiff.
In Lynch v. Motel EnterprisesZ4 where a mentally defective
child drowned in defendant's swimming pool, the court pointed
out the duty of care of a landowner toward children. The pro-
prietor is liable for injuries to children, whether licensees or
trespassers, when (1) he brings or artificially creates something
which is attractive and dangerous to children without taking
reasonable pains to guard them, or (2) a dangerous thing, al-
though not an attractive nuisance, is so "left exposed" that chil-
dren are likely to come in contact with it and their contact with
22. Id. at 371, 150 S.E2d at 81.
23. 370 F2d 692 (4th Cir. 1966).
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it is obviously dangerous to them, and reasonable pains are not
taken to guard them.25
The case of Carter v. BeaJs26 involved an action arising out of
a collision between the plaintiff's northbound automobile and the
defendant's eastbound police automobile which was traveling on
a through street. The issues involved were: (1) Did the evidence
require the conclusion, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff was
guilty of contributory negligence and willfulness in failing to
yield the right of way to the defendant; and (2) Did the trial
judge err in failing to direct a verdict as to punitive damages or
for judgment n.o.v. on the grounds that there was no evidence
of negligence, gross negligence, willfulness or recklessness on
the part of the defendant to support an award of punitive dam-
ages. The court found that there was evidence to the effect that
approaching the stop sign on the street on which the plaintiff
was traveling one's vision of traffic approaching from the left
was obstructed, and that the defendant's car came from the left.
There was also uncontradicted evidence that the defendant was
exceeding the speed limit while chasing a car. There was also
evidence that the police car did not have its siren on or its red
light flashing. The court held that, though a motorist approach-
ing a stop sign must yield the right of way to vehicles approach-
ing so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard, the question
whether a particular vehicle constitutes such a hazard is ordi-
narily one for the jury. Also, if the jury found that the defend-
ant violated the speed limit without using the warning siren and
red light, the award of punitive damages was justified.
In Summers v. Motor S hip Big Ron Tom 2 7 a passenger on a
fishing boat brought action against the owner for personal in-
juries sustained from a fall while standing on the bow of the
boat. The court pointed out that the operator owed his passen-
gers the highest degree of care and must have warned them of
dangers which were not readily apparent.28 However, here the
25. This second basis of liability was recently applied in Everett v. White,
245 S.C. 331, 140 S.E.2d 331 (1965) which is surveyed in Haimbaugh, Annual
Survey of the Law, Torts 18 S.C.L. REv. 141, 156 (1966).
26. 248 S.C. 526, 151 S.E2d 671 (1966).
27. 262 F. Supp. 400 (1967).
28. The court cites on this point, Maibrun v. Hamburg-American S.S. Co.,
77 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1935) and Pacific S.S. Co. v. Holt, 77 F.2d 192 (9th Cir.
1935). An early South Carolina case, McClenaghan v. Brock, 5 Rich. 17, 27
(S.C. 1851) indicates that the carrier's duty to passengers was "to carry each
and all of them safely and securely, as far as human care and foresight could
go. o
6
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court found that the plaintiff's injury was due solely to her own
failure to exercise care for her safety in that she disregarded a'
warning to be seated and continued to jump up and down with
the motion of the boat just before she fell.
The plaintiff in Rogers v. United States"9 had previously
been convicted on a charge of interstate transportation of a
stolen automobile and had received a probationary sentence.
Since he was no longer confined and did not have transportation,
to his home, the federal court in Columbia had issued an order
directing the marshal of the court to provide the plaintiff with
transportation. There was no transportation to the plaintiff's
home available and the plaintiff elected to spend the night in
Sumter, South Carolina, where he had been imprisoned. In
Sumter the plaintiff was told that he could spend the night in
the jail or with any friends he might have in Sumter. The
plaintiff stated that he would stay with one Brabham and ac-
companied Brabham to his home. While there, the plaintiff was
assaulted repeatedly by Brabham who allegedly was "mentally
and sexually unbalanced, being what is commonly referred to as
a sadist." The plaintiff brought action under the Federal Tort
Claims Act for the injuries he sustained. The plaintiff alleged
he was in legal custody of the United States Marshal by the court
order for transportation and should recover despite Section 2680
of the Federal Tort Claims Act. 0 The court granted the de-
fendant's motion for summary judgment holding that where the
defendant had breached no legal duty, the negligent act or
omission required by the Federal Tort Claims Act could not be
established.
D. Statutory Standards of Care
In Kennedy v. Carters' a guest passenger brought action to
recover for personal injuries as a result of an automobile acci-
dent. The plaintiff alleged reckless and wanton acts on the part
of the host driver. The South Carolina Supreme Court pointed
out that the only duty that an operator of a vehicle owes to a
guest passenger is not to injure the guest wilfully or by conduct
in reckless disregard to the guest's rights. The court then found
29. 267 F. Supp. 25 (D.S.C. 1967).
30. 28 U.S.C. § 4283 (1964). '"xceptions-The provisions of this chapter and
Section 1346(b) of this title shall not apply to- .... (b) any claim arising
out of assault, battery, false imprisonment.....
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that evidence that the host driver was in the proper lane, had
his vehicle under control and swerved into the traffic sign only
to avoid a head-on collision with another vehicle in the improper
lane, failed to establish intentional or reckless misconduct on
the host driver's part. The excessive speed of the defendant's
automobile was considered a circumstance of the accident and
the other driver's negligence was the sole proximate cause of the
accident.8 2 One judge thought defendant's speed a contributing
cause.
Stanley v. South Carolina State Highway Dep't03 involved a
suit by a plaintiff on the basis of a statute permitting any per-
son who suffers injury or damage by reason of a defect in a state
highway to sue the department.3 4 The plaintiff alleged that
underbrush obstructed his view at an intersection and as a result
the plaintiff drove into the intersection and collided with an-
other automobile. The Supreme Court of South Carolina strictly
construed the statute permitting suit against the Highway De-
partment and held that the growth of underbrush on the high-
way right-of-way did not constitute a "defect in the highway"
which would entitle the plaintiff to sue.
3 5
E. Contributory Negligence
An action for damages was brought in Benton v. Daviss" for
injuries sustained by a passenger in an automobile, owned by
one defendant, borrowed by another and operated by a third
defendant. There was evidence that the passenger and four
others were riding in the automobile. The five were drinking
and the passenger knew the driver to be a reckless driver and
did not avail himself of the opportunity to leave. The court, in
view of this evidence, found that the case was sufficient to be
submitted to the jury on the question of contributory reck-
lessness. 7
Three cases during the survey period have indicated that plain-
tiffs injured at railroad crossings will be held to a high standard
32. See Horton v. Greyhound Corp., 241 S.C. 430, 128 S.E2d 776 (1962).
33. 153 S.E2d 687 (S.C. 1967).
34. S.C. CODE AnN. § 33-229 (1962).
35. Accord, Phillips v. State Highway Comnim'n, 146 Kan. 112, 68 P.2d 1087
(1937).
36. 150 S.E.2d 235 (S.C. 1966).
37. S.C. CODE AN. § 46-801 (1962) provides that no guest can recover from
his host driver or owner without a showing of intentional or reckless conduct.
The South Carolina cases have consistently held that contributory recklessness
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of care despite the absence of the required statutory warnings38
by crossing trains. In Byrd v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Conz-
pan j 9 the plaintiff was driving at a speed of between fifteen
and twenty miles per hour and applied her brakes prior to the
sounding of the statutory warning. Nevertheless the court found
the plaintiff was guilty of contributory "gross or wilful negli-
gence" 40 because she had an unobstructed view of the track on
a clear day and was familiar with the crossing and the absence
of a regular schedule for train crossings.
In Connelly v. Southern Railway Company 41 the court found
that the plaintiff had failed to exercise even slight care in ap-
proaching a railroad crossing and remanded for a direction of
verdict for the defendant. The plaintiff had "failed to use his
senses of sight and hearing to the best of his ability under the
existing circumstances," 42 by approaching familiar tracks at
twenty-five miles per hour and by making no effort to observe
the approach of a train from his left. In Osborne v. Soutze
Railway Company43 another plaintiff was found guilty of gross
contributory negligence by the district court. Although the train
was travelling at twenty miles per hour, the plaintiff approached
the crossing at thirty-five miles per hour. Although it was pos-
sible to see the train at a distance of 700 to 800 feet, she saw it
when only fifty feet from the crossing. The plaintiff was fa.
miliar with the crossing and the weather was clear. A warning
to future plaintiffs familiar with crossings was sounded:
"Rather than [obstructions of her view excusing] her from see-
ing the train, they only imposed a greater duty upon her to
approach the crossing with more caution for her own safety."44
Thus this element sometimes thought to be favorable to plain-
tiffs4 5 may be used against them in the future.
38. S.C. CODE AxN. § 58-743 (1962). A bell ... or whistle... shall be
rung... or sounded at the distance of at least five hundred yards from the
place where the railroad crosses any public highway .. and shall be kept
ringing or whistling until the engine... has crossed such highway....
39. 154 S.E2d 1 (S.C. 1967).
40. This is the standard required to prevent liability of the railroad when it
has failed to sound the statutory warning. S.C. CoDE- ANN. § 58-1004 (1962).
41. 154 S.E2d 569 (S.C. 1967).
42. Id. at 571.
43. 263 F. Supp. 718 (1967).
44. Id. at 723.
45. Connelly v. Southern Ry., 154 S.E.2d 569 (S.C. 1967), supra, appears
to intimate that an obstructed view might have excused the plaintiff's conduct.
See also Cook v. Atlantic Coastline R.R., 196 S.C. 230, 13 S.E.2d 1 (1941)
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In Easterlin v. Green40 the court held that the failure of a
pedestrian to comply with the statute requiring pedestrians to
walk on the left side of the road facing oncoming traffic47 was
not contributory negligence when the pedestrian was in the south
bound lane and was struck by a north bound vehicle.
F. Gomparative Negligence
In Sturken v. Richland Oil Company48 the Supreme Court of
South Carolina held that the instructions to the jury on con-
tributory negligence constituted prejudicial error to the de-
fendant corporation. The court stated:
Prejudicial error is apparent when we consider that under
the instructions the defense of contributory negligence may
have been rejected by the jury on findings that both parties
were guilty of causal negligence, but that the defendant was
guilty of a higher degree or "grade" of negligence than was
the plaintiff, even though neither party was found to be
guilty of willfulness or wantoness. 4
9
G. Family Purpose Doctrine
In the case of Reid v. Swindler" the administrator of the
estate of Elizabeth Louise Reid, a six year old girl who was
killed as a result of being struck by an automobile driven by
Timothy M. Swindler, a minor, brought action for the alleged
wrongful death. The court based its decision upon the family
purpose doctrine. Liability of a parent is established by this
doctrine when that parent owns, maintains, or furnishes an auto-
mobile for general family use.51 There was evidence that Tim-
othy M. Swindler lived with his parents and customarily drove
the car to high school each day and was on his way home from
school when the accident occurred. There was additional evi-
dence that Mrs. Swindler purchased the car and took the cer-
tificate of title and insurance in her own name. The court held
that the trial judge was required to submit the question of
liability of the mother under the family purpose doctrine to
46. 248 S.C. 389, 150 S.E2d 473 (1966).
47. S.C. CODE Arm. § 46-581 (1962).
48. 248 S.C. 355, 150 S.E2d 341 (1966).
49. Id. at 357, 150 S.E.2d at 341.
50. 154 S.E.2d 910 (S.C. 1967).
51. See, e.g., Norwood v. Coley, 235 S.C. 314, 111 S.E.2d 550 (1959).
[Vol. 19
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the jury and that the evidence was sufficient to warrant a ver-
dict against her.
H. Imputation of Driver's Negligence to Passenger
The plaintiff in Stone v. Barnes52 brought action to recover
damages for personal injuries sustained in an intersection col-
lision with a truck owned by the defendant, The plaintiff was
being driven to the hospital to secure treatment for a severed
thumb when the accident occurred. There was conflicting evi-
dence in regard to the speed of the two vehicles, but the defend-
ant testified that the automobile in which plaintiff was riding
entered the intersection at a speed of 50 miles per hour. There
was also evidence that the passenger could observe the operation
of the automobile and saw the flashing warning signal at the
intersection. The court, while reversing the lower court decision
because of the failure to submit the question of contributory
negligence to the jury, stated that:
[e]ven though the contributory negligence of a driver
of a motor vehicle is not imputed to the occupant thereof,
he must exercise ordinary care for his own safety; and where
the failure of the occupant to exercise ordinary care con-
tributes proximately to cause his injuries, he is guilty of
contributory negligence which will bar him of recovery.
Generally the issue is one of fact for the jury to determine
in the light of all the facts and circumstances existing at
the time.53
L Proximate Cause
In Childers ,v. Gas Lines, Inc.54 a motorcyclist was injured
when his motorcycle collided with debris from a wrecked sign
left at a construction site by the defendant gas company. There
was evidence that a car had struck a traffic sign left on the site
by the company. Shortly thereafter the plaintiff collided with
the debris from the sign. There was also evidence that the sign
was on a traveled area and was unlighted. The supreme court
found that the evidence gave rise to an inference of negligence
on the part of the gas company and that the intervening act
of an automobile striking the sign was not an unforeseeable
52. 248 S.C. 28, 148 S.E2d 738 (1966).
53 Id. at 35, 148 S.E2d at 740.
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intervening cause and that the issue of proximate cause was
properly submitted to the jury.
Lori k v. United States" involved three actions for damages
allegedly caused by the overflight of military aircraft. The
plaintiffs brought action under Federal Tort Claims Act5 to
recover damages to houses and a fish pond. The court stated
that the infliction of damages by the operation of an airplane
is a wrongful act and in itself will give rise to liability and that
it is not necessary to prove negligence in the operation of the
aircraft. However, it is essential to show a causal connection
between the overflight of the aircraft and the property dam-
age.57 In the present case, in light of the evidence presented, the
court found that the nature of the damages sustained negated
any conclusion that they were caused by a "sonic boom" or that
the overflight was a proximate cause of the damage.
I. Ecotoxne ToRTs
In Serino v. Dun c Bradstreet, Inc.5 the plaintiff brought
an action for damages resulting from a negligent misstatement
by the defendant credit reporting agency. The defendant had
issued reports that the plaintiff was a partner in a business with
her son. As a result the plaintiff incurred attorney's fees in
defending herself from the claims of her son's business creditors
and lost a loan she had made to the business. The district court,
after noting that the defendant was under some duty to exercise
due care in regard to the plaintiff, recognized the defense of
qualified privilege. Confronted with this defense, the plaintiff
had to prove actual malice on the defendant's part. Although
no case could be found applying the defense of qualified privi-
lege to a negligence action, the court felt that all of the policy
reasons giving rise to the defense in a defamation action were
equally applicable to a negligence action.59 In light of this de-
fense, and since the plaintiff introduced no evidence of malice,
the defendant's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict was granted.
55. 267 F. Supp. 96 (D.S.C. 1967).
56. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80 (1964).
57. S.C. CODE ANN. § 2-6 (1962) provides for absolute liability for property
damage caused by the flight of an aircraft.
58. 267 F. Supp. 396 (D.S.C. 1967).
59. The court is seemingly unconcerned that a requirement of a showing of
malice is inconsistent with a negligence standard.
[Vol. 19
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In Dauterman v. The State-Record Company60 the plaintiff
was shot by his wife. The defendant published a police report
that was taken directly from Mrs. Dauterman and in her own
words saying that her husband "slapped their baby" and that
"she and her husband had been drinking quite a bit." The South
Carolina Supreme Court held that the statements in the pub-
lications were not libelous. The court felt that the statement that
the plaintiff had "been drinking quite a bit" was substantially
true. As to slapping the baby, the court found that a false state-
ment that a parent on an isolated occasion slapped a child was
not actionable.
B. Invasion of Privacy
The plaintiff in Harrison v. Humble Oil & Refining Com-
pany 61 brought action to recover for invasion of privacy. The
plaintiff was indebted to the defendant and the defendant tele-
phoned the plaintiff's employer and indicated that he wanted to
talk with the plaintiff in regard to the debt. It was conceded
that an unwarranted invasion of privacy will support an action
for damages in South Carolina6O 2 but the court held that the
mere communication to a debtor's employer of the existence of
the debt will not support an action for invasion of privacy. 3
C. Malicious Prosecution and Abuse of Process
The plaintiff in Huggins v. Winn-Dixie Greenville, Inc.64
brought action for malicious prosecution and abuse of process
and the plaintiff received a verdict on the second cause of action
and the defendant appealed. The plaintiff had been arrested for
shoplifting when he allegedly mistakenly forgot to pay for some
ham he had taken from the Winn-Dixie store counter and re-
fused to pay ten dollars for things the store manager felt he
had taken in the past. The South Carolina Supreme Court noted
60. 154 S.E2d 919 (S.C. 1967).
61. 264 F. Supp. 89 (D.S.C. 1967).
62. See, e.g., Meetze v. Associated Press, 230 S.C. 330, 95 S.E.2d 606 (1956);
Holloman v. Life Ins. Co., 192 S.C. 454, 7 S.E.2d 169 (1940).
63. This is the settled rule. See W. PRossER, LAw OF TORTS 835, n.83 (3d
ed. 1964).
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the distinction between action for malicious prosecution and
one for abuse of process in
that a malicious prosecution consists in maliciously caus-
ing process to be issued, whereas an abuse of process is
the employment of legal process for some purpose other than
that which it was intended by the law to effect-the im-
proper use of a regularly issued process.65
The court felt that the case should have gone to the jury on the
question of whether the criminal process of the court was used
to coerce the plaintiff into paying the ten dollars. However, the
court reversed the lower court decision on the grounds that the
trial judge's charge that an officer could not arrest a citizen for
shoplifting without a warrant was prejudicial error because the
legality of the arrest was not in issue and the jury might con-
clude that the absence of a warrant would constitute a basis for
the action.60
65. Id. at 695, quoting from 34 Am. Jum, Malicious Prosecution § 3 (1941).
66. "Illegal arrest gives rise to a cause of action for false arrest or false im-
prisonment, but not to one for abuse of process." Huggins v. Winn-Dixie
Greenville, Inc., 153 S.E.2d 693, 697 (S.C. 1967).
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